FULLAM vs. ADAMS.

A bankrupt law would assuredly work a double benefit, placing
all upon a mercantile equality, and binding the sections of the
whole country more firmly, together.
May it be the honor of the next Congress to lay aside minor
questions, and, meeting on a common ground of mercy to the
unfortunate and justice to the active business men of the country,
pass with unanimity - a measure so fraught with beneficence to
all, and for which they will receive the blessings of thousands."
J. F. B.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
SEWELL FULLAM VS. WARREN ADAMS.
The defendant retained the plaintiffas his attorney in any litigation that might
grow out of a conveyance to him by his brother, John Adams, who had failed;
and in consideration of sudh retainer promised the plaintiff verbally to pay him
one-half of a debt of three or four hundred dollars, due to the plaintiff from said
John, and also promised to pay the plaintiff for his services, if he performed
any.
Held, That defendant's promise to pay the debt of John Adams to the plaintiff
was a promise within the Statute of Frauds, and not being in writing could not
be enforced by action. That a verbal promise to pay the debt of another, where
the original debt still subsists, is never legally binding, except where the promissor has received the funds or property of the debtor for the purpose of being
so applied, so that an obligation or duty rests upon him, as between himself and
the debtor, to make such payment, whireby his promise, though in form to pay
the debt of another, is in fact a promise to perform an obligation or duty of his
own.
A retainer of an attorney is a sufficient consideration to support a promise to
pay such attorney a debt due him from another, if such promise be in writing.

Sewell Fullam, plaintiff, pro se.
J. F. Dean 4 J. A. Wing, for defendant.
POLAND, 0. J.-The defendant retained the plaintiff as his
attorney, in any litigation that might grow out of a conveyance
to him of certain property by his brother John Adams (who had
failed); and, in consideration of such retainer, promised the
plaintiff, verbally, to pay him one-half of a debt of three or four
hundred dollars, due to the plaintiff from the said John, and also
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promised to pay the plaintiff for his services, if he performed any.
The defendant claims, that his promise is supported by no legal
consideration, and therefore does not bind him. It has long been
the practice for members of the bar to receive fees for merely
being retained by clients, and to charge for such retainers, without any special contract or promise to pay; and it has never been
doubted in this state, to our knowledge, that lawyers were properly and legally entitled to make such charges. The amount of
such charges has of course varied greatly, depending upon the
amount 'and importance of the matter in controversy, and the
professional standing of the counsel. Where, upon such retainer,
the client expressly promises to pay a certain sum, we think it
cannot be said to be a promise without consideration, and that
such consideration must be regarded as sufficient and adequate to
the extent of the sum he has promised to pay.
The important question in the case is, whether this promise
bound the defendant, it not being in writing. It was in terms a
promise 'to pay the debt of another, or a portion of the debt of
another. The liability of John Adams for his debt to the plaintiff still subsisted precisely to the same extent as before. The
plaintiff insists, that in substance the defendant's promise was to
pay him a certain sum for his retainer, absolutely, to be determined in amount merely, by reference to his debt against John
Adams; that if John Adams should himself have paid the plaintiff the full amount of his debt, the plaintiff would still be entitled
to recover the agreed price for his retainer from the defendant;
and, that if the defendant first paid the plaintiff one-half the
amount of John Adams's debt, such payment would not operate
to extinguish any part of the debt, as between the plaintiff and
John Adams, but the plaintiff would still have the right to collect
his whole debt from John. If the facts proved on the trial will
justify this construction, then the case is clear of any question
under the Statute of Frauds; it was no promise to pay the debt
of another, but to pay his own debt. But, in our view, it is clear,
this was not the real transaction between the parties, but it was
in effect and purpose a contract by the defendant to guaranty, or
become respohsible for the payment to the plaintiff of one-half
his debt against John Adams; that the defendant's liability to
pay depended upon the continued existence of John Adams's
debt, and if John Adams himself paid his full debt to the plain.
tiff, it would extinguish all claim of the plaintiff against the
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defendant; and if the defendant, under his contract with plaintiff, had paid him one-half the amount of John's debt, it would
operate to prevent the plaintiff from collecting of John more than
the half remaining unpaid.
The defendant's promise to the plaintiff was, therefore, a
promise to pay a pre-existing, and still subsisting, debt of another,
founded upon the consideration of the plaintiff's retainer, by the
defendant, as his counsel in his own personal matters; which we
regard as sufficient to sustain the contract, if it had been in
writing.
The question, whether the defendant's promise was valid withoutwriting, opens the door to an examination to an almost endless extent, of judicial discussion and determination, both in England and this country, and we can hardly hope to do more than
to add another decision to the long line, which may serve to perplex future explorers into the true meaning of this section of this
ancient statute. There are some things that have alivays been
undisputed in all the cases arising under it; one is, that the promise must be supported by a valid consideration. This was so
before the statute, and the statute added the further requirement
that the promise should be in writing. In the case of a promise
to pay a pre-existing debt of another, it has always been held
that there must be a new or further consideration to support it;
that the original consideration upon which the debt rested was
not enough, and could not be used to support the new promise.
But it was never considered necessary that the new consideration should be one that was beneficial to the promissor, in order to
make his promise binding, if in writing; if it was, or might be,
detrimental to the promissee, it was enough, like forbearance of
his debt. So too, the promises mentioned in this section of the
statute, are those of suretyship, or guaranty for the debt of
another, which still subsists against him ; for if the effect of the
new promise or contract be to discharge the original debt, the
promissor becomes the sole debtor, and there is no debt of another
to which his promise is collateral, therefore such promise is not
within the purpose and spirit of the statute, and need not be in
writing. In the present case, as before said, we regard the defendant's promise as one for the payment of a pre-existing and
still subsisting debt of another, and therefore within the terms
of the statute ; still it does not follow that he is not bound by it,
though not in writing, for it is well established that a parol pro-
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mise to pay the debt of another, which still subsists in full force
against him, in favor of another, may. be binding upon such
promissor.
This statement seems to be almost a direct contradiction of the
express language of the statute; but it is established by repeated
decisions in England, in the American courts generally, and by
several decisions in this state. The decisions are contradictory
enough, as to what is necessary in order to make such a promise
binding, but all agree that there may be a state of facts which
will make it so. What is that state of facts which will take a
parol promise to pay the still subsisting debt of another out of
the statute? and do the facts of the plaintiff's case make it one
of that class? Many attempts have been made by different judges
and law writers, to lay down a precise rule or definition by which
it could be at once determined, whether such promise was or was
not within the statute, but the rules have given rise to the same
conflict of debate and decision which attended the original rule
of the statute itself. In an early decision in this country, Leonard vs. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29, Chancellor KENT, then Chief
Justice, divided the cases under this section of the Statute of
Frauds into three classes. His third class, in which the plaintiff
claims to include his case, is as follows: " Where the promise to
pay the debt of another arises out of some new consideration of
benefit or harm moving between the newly-contracting parties.
This class he says are not included within the statute. The very
general language in which this rule is laid down, and the great
authority given to it by the high character of its author, induced
many decisions in this country which were directly in the teeth
of the statute, in both its letter and spirit. Indeed, at one
period the decisions seemed to go the extent of holding, that if
the new promise was supported by an adequate legal consideration, it was not within the statute, which was just equivalent to
denying the statute any force whatever. In Farley vs. Cleveland,
4 Cow. 432, Ch. J. SAVAGE attempted an improvement on this
definition, so as to make it more precise and accurate. Speaking
of Chancellor KENT'S third class, he says: "in all these cases
founded on a new and original consideration of benefit to the
defendant, or harm to the plaintiff, moving to the party making
the promise, either from the plaintiff or original debtor, the gubsisting liability of the original debtor is no objection to a recovery." In a very recent case in the same state in the Court of
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Appeals, this subject received great consideration: Mallory vs.
Gillett, 21 N. Y. Rep. 412. The plaintiff had made repairs to
the amount of $125, upon a canal-boat belonging to one Haines,
and had the boat in his possession, under his lien for the repairs,
and refused to surrender the boat until the amount due him for
the repairs was paid. In consideration that the plaintiff would
deliver up the boat to Haines, the defendant promised by parol,
to pay the plaintiff for the repairs made on the boat. The action
was brought on this promise, and the defendant claimed he was
not bound, because his promise was not in writing. Five of the
judges held the promise not binding, because not in writing, while
the other three held, that under the decisions in that state, following the rule laid down by Chancellor KENT, the promise of
the defendant was not within the statute, and that the defendant
was legally bound. The majority held the defendant's promise
to be ndt binding without writing, because the consideration for
it (the surrender of plaintiff's lien on the boat) was to Haines his
debtor, and so was not one tht inured to the advantage of the
defendant. The majority opinion was delivered by CoMsTocK,
C. J., and contains a most able and exhaustive examination of
the cases on this branch of the statute.
He endeavors also to reduce the promises for the debts or
defaults of others, which are, or are not, within the statute, to
classes. Among those not within the statute, he brings the following :-" Where, although the debt remains, the promise is
founded on a new consideration, which moves to the promissor.
This consideration may come from the debtor-as when he puts
a fund into the hands of the promissee, either by absolute transfer,
or upon a trust to pay the debt,-or it may be in his hands
charged with the debt as a prior lien, as in the case of Williams
vs. Leper, and many others. So the consideration may originate
in a new and independent dealing between the promissor and creditor, the undertaking to answer for the debt of another being
one of the incidents of that dealing. Thus A., for any compensation agreed on between him and B., may undertake that C.
shall pay his debt to B." In this opinion Ch.J. COMSTOCK endeavors to show, that both upon principle and by a great majority
of adjudged cases in New York, and elsewhere, where a creditor
has a security of any sort in his hands for the payment of his
debt, and surrenders it to his debtor upon the promise of a third
person to pay his debt, such promise is within the statute, and
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not binding unless made by writing; but if such security be surrendered to the party making the promise, for his own benefit and
advantage, the promise, though by parol, is not within the statute,
and binds the promissor. Though there are adjudged cases to the
contrary, it is shown -clearly, as we think, that by the great
majority of decisions, these conclusions of the majority of the
court are fully sustained. But wherein consists the difference
in the two cases, so that in one the parol promise is binding,
and not in the other? The promise in both is to pay the debt of
another, for which he still continues liable. The surrender of the
security is equally a detriment to the creditor in both cases, and
in either case forms an aiaple consideration for the new promise,
if in writing. An examination of some of the cases will, we
believe, develop the reason, and the true principle upon which the
distinction is made. It has been often decided, that where the
purchaser of property promises to pay the price to a creditor of
the vendor, such promise is binding, though not in writing, and
the vendor still remains liable for the debt: Barber vs. Bucklin,
2 Denio 45; Dearborn vs. Parks, 5 Greenl. 81; Farley vs.
Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432, are samples of this class of cases. In
some of these cases it is said, the promise is not within the statute, because in substance it is a promise to pay the promissor's
own debt for the purchased property, and that although the fulfilment of his promise to pay his own debt, has the effect to pay
the debt of another, it does not bring his promise within the
statute, as this effect is incidental, and not the principal object
and purpose of the promise. And where a debtor transfers funds
or property to another for the purpose of paying his debt, and'
the person thus holding the debtor's funds or property promises"
the creditor to pay his debt, such promise is held good, though
not in writing'. This was held in this state in Wait vs. Wait, 28.
Vt. 350, and has also been decided in a subsequent case in Rutland county not yet reported, and many cases in other states support the same doctrine. We apprehend the true principle why
the promise to the creditor is valid without writing, is the same
in both these classes of cases. In both, the party making the
promise, holds the funds of the debtor for the purpose of paying
his debt, and as between him and the debtor, it is his duty to pay
the debt, so that when he p'romises the creditor to pay it, in substance he promises to pay his own debt, and not that of another;
and though the debtor still remains liable for the debt, his real
VOL. XII.-30
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relation is rather that of a surety for the party whose duty it is,
and who has promised to pay his debt, than of .a principal for
whom the other has become surety or guarantor. He holds a
fund in trust, under a duty to pay it to the creditor, and he makes
an express promise to perform it. In such case, it is no violation
of the spirit of the statute, to hold such promise an original one,
and not necessary to be in writing. The cases which decide that
where a creditor holds a security for his debt, and surrenders it
to a third person, for his own benefit, upon his promise to be
answerable for the debt, stand really upon the same substantial
principle. The early case of Williams vs. Leper, 8 Burr. 1886,
is the starting-point of all this class of cases, and the decision
seems to be put exactly on this giound.
Taylor was the tenant of the plaintiff, and in arrear for his
rent; he was insolvent, and conveyed all his effects for the benefit of his creditors; they employed Leper the defendant as a
broker to sell them, and he advertised them for sale: On the
morning of the sale the plaintiff came to the house to distrain
the goods for his unpaid rent, whereupon the defendant promised
the plaintiff if he would not distrain he would pay the rent due
him. The plaintiff desisted from distraining, and allowed the
defendant to sell the goods. It was held by the court, that his
promise to pay the plaintiff was valid, though not in writing.
Lord MANSFIELD said: " The re8 gestae would entitle the plaintiff
to his action against the defendant. The goods are the fund ;
Leper was a trustee for all the creditors, and was obliged to pay
the landlord, who had the prior lien." The decision went clearly
upon the ground, that as the plaintiff had the prior lien on the
goods for the payment of his rents, and surrendered it to the
defendant on his promise to pay the rent, it became a trust in his
hands for the payment of the plaintiff's debt, and his promise
was not that of a surety or guarantor for Taylor, but for the performance of his own duty. This case was followed by Castling
vs. Aubert, 2 East 825. The plaintiff was under liabilities for
one Grayson, and held certain policies of insurance as security
therefor. The defendant was the agent of Grayson for the management of his insurance affairs, and, a loss having happened, the
defendant needed the policies in order to get the money, and
applied to the plaintiff to surrender them to him, which the
plaintiff did upon the defendant's promise to pay the acceptances

for which the plaintiff was liable.

This promise was not in wri-
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ting. It was claimed that under the Statute of Frauds, the prbmise was not binding, but the court held that it was, and said
it was rather a purchase of the securities which the plaintiff held
in his hands, and that the defendant had in contemplation not
principally the discharge of Grayson, but the discharge of himself. Edwards vs. Kelly, 6 M. & S. 204, and many other English cases, follow in the same line of decision, and the substance
of all of them is, that in such case the party making the promise
is liable, because by the arrangement he becomes the holder of a
fund or security which was appropriated to the payment of the
debt, and clothed with a duty or trust in 'respect thereto, which
the law will enforce in favor of the party to whom the promise is
made. In all this class of cases the promise is upon a new consideration which moves to the promissor, and, therefore, they come
within all the definitions or rules before mentioned; but is it true
that in every case where there is a new consideration moving to
the promissor, the promise to pay the debt of another is good,
without writing? Especially, is the statement quoted before from
Oh. J. COMSTOCK, "that A., for any compensation agreed on
between him and B., may undertake that C. shall pay his debt to
B., good without writing ?" That is the precise proposition the
plaintiff claims to sustain in this case, and the case put by him in
argument, of.a parol promise to pay, or to guaranty the payment
of a debt of another for a hundred or a thousand dollars, in consideration of ten dollars paid the promissor by the creditor, illustrates the proposition exactly. It is a new consideration moving
between the newly-contracting parties, and for the benefit of the
party making the promise, and hence clearly within the terms of
the rule. But we have found no case among the multitude on the
subject, which supports the proposition to this extent; and where
the promise is a mere contract of guaranty, we think it comes
within the statute, though a distinct consideration therefor be
paid directly to the party making the promise.
The subject is well illustrated by the decisions in the case of
factors selling goods under a del credere commission, where the
agreement is by parol. It was at one time held, that the factor's
agreement to guaranty his sales, was not binding unless in writing; that it was a promise within the Statute of Frauds. But
the contrary is now firmly established both in England and this
country: Couturier vs. Hastia et al., 16 Eng. L. & Eq. 562;
rolff vs. Kopvel, 5 Hill 458; Swan vs. Nesmith, 7 Pick. 220.
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If it be true that a new consideration moving directly between
the parties, and to the promissor, is sufficient to sustain a verbal
promise to pay the debt of another, it would seem there never
could have been any question about the Statute of Frauds, for
the payment of the additional per cent. for the guaranty would
always have been sufficient. But the cases which hold the factor
bound by his verbal agreement are placed upon no such basis.
In the case from 5th Hill, CoWEN, J., says : "The implied promise of the factor is merely that he will sell to persons in good
credit at the time, and in order to charge him negligence must
be shown. He takes an additional commission, however, and adds
to his obligation that he will make no sales except to persons
absolutely solvent; in legal effect, that he will be liable for the
loss which his conduct may bring upon the plaintiff, without the
onus of proving negligence. The merchant holds the goods, and
will not part with them to the factor without this extraordinary
stipulation, and a commission is paid to him for enterifig into it.
What is this after all but another form of selling the goods ? Its
consequences are the same in substance. Instead of paying cash,
the factor prefers to contract a debt or a duty which obliges him
to see the money paid. The debt or duty is his own, and arises
from an adequate consideration." Baron PARKE, in the English
case cited, upholds the parol promise of the factor upon substantially the same ground with Judge CowEN, and he adds: -Doubtless, if they had for a per centage guaranteed the debt owing, or
performance of the contract by the vendee, being totally unconnected with the sale, they would not be liable without a note in
writing signed by them; but being the agents to negotiate the
sale, the commission is paid in respect to that employment."
This is a clear denial of the proposition, that a new consideration
moving from the creditor to the guarantor takes the guaranty out
of the statute, and all the cases proceed upon the ground, that
the factor's promise in such case stands upon the consideration
of his own duty and obligation, growing out of his employment.
In the case of Anderson vs. Davis, 9 Vt. 136, Lamb had contracted to erect a building for the defendant, and had partially
completed it when he was taken sick, and the work ceased. The
plaintiff had worked for Lamb on the building, and, in consideration that the plaintiff would go on and complete the building, the
defendant promised to pay him for his future services, and also
for his previous labor. It was held that this promise to pay for
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the previous labor, done Tor Lamb, was not binding, not being in
writing. It was conceded, that the consideration was sufficient
to sustain the promise, provided it hail been in writing. But
here was a new consideration moving 'from the promissee to
the promissor. In Loomis vs. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159, the plaintiff
had boarded the defendant's son, for which the son was liable;
and in consideration that the plaintiff would continue to board
the son, the defendant promised the laintiff to pay him for
both the past and future board. It was.'held that the promise to
pay for the debt of the son for the pa~t board was within the
statute, and therefore not binding. In this case also it was conceded by the court that the consideration was ample to sustain the
promise for the whole, if it had been in writing. This was a case
of a new consideration between the parties, the furnishing future
supplies to the son at the defendant's request. The court "further
decided in this case, that although the defendant's promise to pay
for the future supplies would be good without writing, still as the
contract was entire and not binding for the debt already accrued,
it was invalid also for the future. In the case of an illegal contract, or one founded on an illegal consideration, this was undoubtedly correct, but parol contracts or promises within the
Statute of Frauds are not illegal or void; the statute simply
takes away the right to enforce them by suit. This was held
differently in Anderson vs. Davis, and rightly, as we think.
These cases are cited to show that it is not true that in every
case where the new promise is founded upon a new consideration
moving wholly between the parties to the guaranty, the promise
is taken out of the statute. It depends upon the transaction
itself, the general object and purpose, or, as Lord MANSFIELD
expressed it, on the res gestm. If the leading purpose and object
be to guaranty, or become responsible for the payment of a third
person's debt, then the promise is within the statute although it
may be founded upon a consideration directly between the parties.
It is almost impossible to imagine a case where a promise to pay
the debt of another, for which he remains liable, upon a consideration moving wholly from the creditor and in which the debtor has
nd concern; where the leading object and purpose can be any
other than to make the promissor the surety or guarantor of the
debt. In such case no duty or obligation is imposed on the promissor as between him and the debtor; his obligation is wholly to
the creditor, and rests entirely upon his promise or contract with
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him. It is scarcely reasonable to suppoke one would part with a
consideration belonging wholly to himself, where the value was
equal to the amount of a debt due him, from another, even to
obtain the promise of a third person to pay it. If the consideration for the promise is much less in value than the amount of the
debt, it would afford a strong presumption that reliance was
placed to some extent upon the chances that the debtor would
pay it himself, and therefore the promissor not be called upon at
all upon his undertaking. But the strong reason given why it is
not a guaranty and a collateral promise is, that it should be
treated as a purchase of the consideration, and when payment is
made it is really paying for property purchased, or whatever else
the consideration may be. But if so, then when he has made the
payment he has only paid for what he received of the creditor,
and the debt is just as much due as before, and may be collected
by the creditor of the debtor, and neither would payment of the
original debt by the debtor afford any protection to the party
making the new promise from paying for what he has purchased
of the creditor. But if the parties in entering into the new contract really contemplate a sale of property from one to the other,
or the performance of services by one for the other for a stipulated price to be paid, it is scarcely comprehensible why the contract should assume the form of a promise to pay the debt of
another, and especially where the amount of such debt is unknown
and unliquidated. As stated earlier in this opinion, if this was
the real transaction it would have nothing to do with the statute,
because really it would have nothing to do with the debt of
another. But in such case the purpose hnd intent is clear to
enter into a contract to guaranty or answer for the debt of
another, and what is paid or done as a consideration is for that
purpose simply, and to call it a purchase -and sale is a simple
perversion of those terms. If the real substance of the promise
be to perform some duty or obligation of the party making the
promise, it is not within the statute, though in form it is a
promise to pay another's debt, and the result of its performance
may effect the payment of the debt of another. And we believe
it will be found that in all the cases now regarded as sound, where
it has been held that a parol promise to pay the debt of another
is binding, the promissor held in his hands funds, securities, or
property of the debtor, devoted to the payment of the debt, and
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his promise to pay .attaches upon his obligation or duty, growing
out of the receipt of such fund.
In support of these views we refer further to Nelson vs. Boynont, 3 Met. 396, Kingsley vs. Balcom, 4 Barb. 131, and Browne
on Statute of Frauds, ch. 10. In the present case we regard the
defendant's promise as essentially a contract of guaranty of onehalf the amount of John Adams's debt, and though founded upon
a sufficient consideration moving directly to the defendant, it was
a promise within the statute, and not being in writing, not enforceable at law. Where a promise to pay.the debt of ahother is
founded upon the consideration of property sold by the debtor to
the promissor, to be paid for to his creditor, if payment is not
made accordingly, and the debtor is compelled to pay his debt, he
is entitled to have pay for his property sold. If he places prop'erty or funds in the hands of another to pay his debt, and it is
not done, he is entitled to his property again. If a creditor
holds securities of his debtor of any sort for the payment of his
debt, and surrenders them to a third person upon his promise to
pay the debt, and he fails to do so, and the debtor pays his own
debt, he is entitled to have his securities returned to him, or
applied for his benefit. In this case the defendant received
nothing, and held nothing in his hands, for the payment of John
Adams's debt.* If John Adams paid the debt to the plaintiff, the
defendant was under no liability to either of them for anything
he had received. His obligation to the plaintiff began with, and
rested solely upon his promise. It is a naked promise to pay the
debt of another, and within the statute, if one can be, where it is
founded on a new consideration moving to the promissor, which we
have tried to show may be the case. It is claimed that several
decisions in this state support the plaintiff's right to recover in
this case, and it is true that in: some of our cases the same general language is used that has already been referred to; that when
the promise is founded upon a new consideration moving between
the parties, it is not within the statute ; but an examination of
the cases, we believe, will show them all to have been correctly
decided, even in the view we have taken of the principle governing such cases. French vs. Thompson, 6 Vt. 54: The plaintiff
had been guardian of one Hurlbut, and held securities and property belonging to his ward. He resigned his guardianship, and
the defendant was appointed guardian in his place. The defendant promised the plaintiff, that if he would deliver to him the
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securities and property of his ward, he the defendant would pay
the plaintiff's accoux4 for his payments and exp.enditures while
acting as guardian. The promise, though not in writing, was
held good. Lampson vs. Hobart, 28 Vt. 697: The plaintiff and
defendant were creditors of the same debtor. The plaintiff was
about to attach the debtor's property, when the defendant promised, that if the plaintiff would desist making his attachment,
and allow the defendant to attach the property upon his debt, he
would pay the plaintiff's debt. The plaintiff thereupon desisted,
and allowed the defendant to take the debtor's property. The
court treated this as a case where the plaintiff had obtained a
security for his debt, and in consideration of its surrender to the
defendant, he made the promise. The promise was held binding,
though not in writing. If there was any error in the case, it was
in treating the plaintiff as having already obtained a security on
the property, but that does not vary the principle of the decision.
Cross vs. Bichardson, 30 Vt. 641: The plaintiff had an attachment on certain logs of his debtor Brown, and had trusteed certain
debtors of Brown. In consideration that the plaintiff would
release his attachment on the logs, and release the trustees, so that
the defendant could bid off the logs at a sheriff's sale, and have
them sawed by the trustees, he promised the plaintiff to pay him
$100 on Brown's debt. This promise was held good, though by
parol merely.
Templeton vs. Bascom, 33 Vt. 132: The plaintiff had a debt
against the defendant's father, who had died, leaving ample property for the payment of his debts. The defendant was the sole
heir to his father's estate, and all the property was in his hands.
In consideration that the plaintiff would not proceed to take out
administration, and enforce payment of his debt out of the
estate, the defendant promised to pay it. This was held not
within the statute, though by parol. In this case the plaintiff not
only relinquished his right, in favor of the defendant, to the funds
in his hands, to which he had the right to look for payment, but
his omission to proceed against them operated as a discharge of
the debt itself.
But in all these cases tle plaintiff surrendered, and the defendant received, a fund or a security charged with the payment of
the plaintiff's debt, and all come within the class of Williams vs.
Leper and Castling vs. Aubert, and upon the same ground with
those were properly held not to fall within the statute. We know
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of no case in this state where the parol promise of one to pay
the debt of another, has been upheld upon any other consideration than the receipt of some fund or other security, either from
the debtor or creditor, charged with the payment of the debt, so
that a trust or duty was created thereby to pay the debt, and so
that in making the payment of the debt he was really fulfilling
an obligation of his own. When carried further than this, the
statute is really repealed. If it be true, that "A., for any compensation agreed on between him and B., may undertake that C.
shall pay his debt to B.," as laid down by Ch. J. COMSTOCK, and
such prdmises held good without writing, then truly the Statute
of Frauds, and its labor, have been in vain. If parol evidence
can be made sufficient to charge one man with the payment of
another's debt, however large, by proving a promise, and a con
sideration of a pepper-corn, or a day's work, or some other of
equal value, every beneficial purpose of the statute is gone. No
better scheme could have been devised before the days of the
statute of the 29th of Charles the 2d, to establish a claim against
a man by false testimony, than this would be. The statute was
passed by reason of the strong temptation to make others responsible for the debts of irresponsible and insolvent debtors, and
the facility afforded by the testimony of corrupt witnesses to
establish such contracts, if allowed to be prove'd by verbal testimony; hence, the evidence of any such promise by a third party
was required to be in writing. But if the statute can be avoided
by finding a corrupt witness to swear to such promise, and in
addition to anything paid or done which in law could constitute a
consideration to the party himself, the use for such witnesses is
by no means at an end. The decisions have gone quite far
enough, in holding such parol promises binding when made upon
the consideration of having received, or holding the debtor's
funds or property for that purpose.
The judgment, which was for the plaintiff in the County
Court, is reversed, and a new trial granted.
The foregoing opinion, which seems
to us one of great importance and value
to the profession, as well on account
of its originality of view and thoroughness of research and fulness of illustration in regard to a complicated and
difficult question, as for its great clear-

ness and singleness of point and purpose, we have studied with more interest
and attention, and with a more extensive comparison with the decided cases,
both English and American, than it is
always in our power to do. We should,
before this decision, have felt some
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hesitation whether the main proposition
upon which the argument of the case
turns, be not stated in too unqualified
terms. Unless that be so, the case
must work a wonderful revolution, and
introduce an astonishing degree of simplicity into what has hitherto been regarded as one of great difficulty and
perplexity. The cardinal proposition
of the case seems to be "Ithat in all the
cases now regarded as sound, where it
has been held that a parol promise to
pay the debt of another is binding, the
promissor held in his hands funds, securities, or property of the debtor, devoted to the payment of the debt, and
his promise to pay attaches upon the
obligation or dfity, growing out of the
receipt of such fund." This, we suppose, is intended to embrace only such
promises as cover the payment of the
still subsisting debt of another. For
there is no question that the sale of the
debt of another, or any arrangement
whereby the debt of anotherbecomes extinguished, may form the basis or consideration for a promise of the payment
of the debt thus sold or extinguished,
and which promise will be entirely valid,
although not in writing. This is held
in a very large number of cases, both
English and American, collected in
Browne's Stat. Frauds,
193, n. 1;
Goodman vs. Chase, 1 B. & Ad. 297;
Bird vs. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883;
Butcher vs. Steuart, 11 M. & W. 857;
Curtis vs. Brown, 5 Cush. 492, by SHAw,

C. J.; Anderson vs. Davis, 9 Vt. R. 136;
Templetons vs. Bascom, 33 Vt. R. 132,
and numerous others.
But the proposition of the learned
judge is clearly intended to embrace
only cases where the debt of the original contractor still continues, as a
subsisting obligation. And in this
class of cases some judges have claimed
that the new contract for the payment
of a still subsisting debt of another,

must always come within the statute.
And there is great plausibility in this
view since the terms of the statute are
"to charge the defendant upon any
special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another person;" thus apparently including all
cases of that class; but there are,
nevertheless, some cases, where the
original debt is still subsisting, that a
promise to pay the debt, or a specified
portion of it, has been held not to come
within the statute. Thus, a promise to
one's creditor to pay his debt to another
person, is held not to fall within the
statute, although a promise to pay the
debt of another, because not made to
the party to whom the debt is owing:
Eastwood vs. Kenyon, ll.Ad. & Ellis
438. So also there is a very numerous
class of cases where the promissor assumes the payment of a subsisting debt
of another, by a promise made directly
to the creditor to whom the debt is due,
and the promise is not considered to
fall within the statute, because it is
made upon the waiver of a lien or security for the debt, or such a lien or
security about to be effected, and where
the waiver enures for the benefit of the
promissor: Williams vs. Leper, 3 Burr.
1886 ; Castling vs. Nubert, 2 East 325;
Edwards vs. Kelly, 6 M. & S. 204;
Allen vs. Thompson, 10 N. H. 32;
Lampson vs. Hobart, 28 Vt. R. 700.
This class of cases is regarded as a virtual purchasing the lien or security,
and the promise as a payment for the
lien or security, and not a mere
undertaking for the debt of another.
Hence, although the lien or security be
perfected, and expressly waived, and
the debt thereby lost to the creditor,
the promise of payment will not be
valid without writing, unless the security thus waived or abandoned shall
have enured to the benefit of the promissor. This distinction is very care-
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fully defined by SHAw, C. 3., in Nelson
vs. Boynton, 3 Met. 896. The same
rule seems to be recognised in Tomlinson vs. Gell, 6 Ad. & Ellis 564, PATTrsON, J.: "The cases on that point are
where something has been given up by
the plaintiff and acquired by the party
making the promise, as the security of
goods for a debt." See, also, Gull vs.
Lindsay, 4 Wels., Hurlst. & G. 45.
But some of the English cases intimate
a doubt, whether such a transaction is
within the statute, even although no
benefit enures to the promissor from
the new contract or arrangement: Macrory vs. Scott, 5 W., H. & G. 907.
But it seems agreed on all hands, that
where an adequate benefit accrues to
the new promissor, it is not material,
whether it spring from the original
debtor or the creditor; all of which
seems to favor the view maintained by
the learned judge in the principal case,
thus making the question, whether
within the statute or not, to turn upon
the nature of the consideration rather
than that of the promise. And we
have been 'surprised at the very large
proportion of the cases, under this
phase of the question, which will readily range themselves under the leading
proposition already quoted from the
opinion.
1. We therefore conclude, without
hesitation, that the converse of the
-proposition stated by the learned judge
is clearly maintainable, both upon principle and the decided eases: i. e., that
wherever the new promissor' holds in
his hands, or control, any fund, security, or indemnity, that, to the extent
of that indemnity, his promise to pay
money to another, although in payment
of the subsisting debt of a third person,
is an original undertaking, and so not
within the established construction of
the Statute of Frauds. And when the
party thus assuming to pay the debt of
another represents himself to the cre-

ditor as being indemnified, or, for any
other reason, as acting on his own behalf, and not as surety for the original
debtor, he is estopped by such representation and bound by his undertaking,
although not in writing.
This point will be fully illustrated
by the matter of suretyship. In every
case of mere naked suretyship the promise must be in writing to become
binding. But where the party assuming a nominal suretyship is in fact indemnified by the principal, he becomes
thus far a principal, and bound, as
such, to indemnify his co-sureties to
the extent of such indemnification, and
it is the same whether he retain his in-.
demnity or afterwards surrender it to
the principal. For having once assumed the position of a principal towards the co-sureties, he cannot exonerate himhself from the obligation of that
position except by the consent of such
co-sureties. And one who is, in fact, a
co-surety, may assume only the position
of surety for the other sureties, and all
this may be proved without writing;
and upon such proof a co-surety will be
compelledto stand asprincipal, although
in fact but a surety, and although his
promise of full indemnity to the other
sureties be not in writing: Craythorne
vs. Swinburne, 14 Vesey 160; Pendebury vs. Walker, 4 Y. & C. 424; Keith
vs. Goodwin, 31 Vt. R. 268; Moore vs.
Isley, 2 Dev. & Batt. 372.
It has sometimes been attempted to
infer, that because contracts of indemnity are valid without writing, if
absolute and unconditional, therefore
all such contracts were not within the
statute: BAYL , J., in Thomas vs.
Cook, 8'B. & Cr. 728. But this proposition is not maintainable, since it might
be made to embrace all contracts for the
debt or default of another, and thus
virtually repeal the statute: DENmAN,
C. T., in Green vs. Cresswell, 10 Ad. &
Ellis 453. But all contracts of indem-
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nity against loss for assuming responsibility for another are binding, although
not in writing, where the party making
them acts for himself and consents to
become primarily responsible: Harrison
vs. Sawtel, 10 Johns. 242; Chapin vs.
Merrill, 4 Wend. 657. But see Kingsley
vs. Balcome, 4 Barb. 131. That will
always be the case when no other party
is responsible, as where, upon discharging an action of tort, a third
party promises to pay a definite sum
as damages, or as damages and costs
in the action: Read vs. Nash, 1 Wile.
305. So, also, a promise to indemnify
one for resisting a claim of tithe, in
order to try the right, is an original
and not a collateral promise, for the
same reason: Adams vs. Dansey, 6
Bing. 506 ; and in the very latest case
in the English courts, where the question of an indemnifying promise is considered, Cripps vs. Hartnoll, Exchequer Chamber, -1864, 10 Jur. N. S. 200,
reversing s. c. 8 Jur. N. S. 1010, it
was decided, that a promise to indemnify one for becoming bail for a person
charged with crime, without communication with the principal, is an original
and not a collateral undertaking, inasmuch as no contract or privity existed
in a criminal case so circumstanced,
between the accused and his bail. And
it seems fairly deducible from this decision, that in all analogous cases, both
civil and criminal, the party upon whose
credit the bail is entered will be primarily liable, without writing, unless
the principal is also held responsible
by the bail. Thus, the case of Green
vs. Cresswell, 10 Ad. & Ellis 453, is
virtually overruled, since the implied
promise of indemnity on the part of the
principal will not attach except by his
consent. Hence we conclude:
2. That although the consideration
of a promise, as that the party is fully
indemnified, may be important, and
even decisive, in many cases, that the
promise was made as principal and not

as surety, and that it is therefore original and not collateral, an is argued
with great force and justice in th'e
principal case, it may not be equally
clear, that every case of a promise to
pay money, which goes in discharge
of the subsisting debt of another, is
within the statute, unless the party
making it were fully indemnified. So
that while the converse of the proposition maintained in the principal case
is most unquestionable, the proposition
itself is less so.
Some writers of great weight claim
that the consideration of the promise is
never to be regarded as at all decisive,
in determining whether the contract is
original or collateral. WILLIAMS, J.,
in the late case of Fitzgerald vs. Dressler, 5 C. B. N. S. 885, 7 C. B. N. S. 374,
5 Jur. N. S. 598, said: "The test whether within the statute never can be
what the consideration is: 1 Wins.
Saund. 211 e, n. i. There must be a
new contract to take it out of the statute." And it seems now tb be generally regarded as chivy decisive, in
regard to a promise to pay meney
which goes in discharge of tke subsist
ing debt or duty of asotiwr, whether
within the statute or not, tkat it is
made and accepted by the creditor as
an original undertaking, and not mserely
as subsidiary to that of another. Thus:
3. In all cases where the original
contractor is an infatt, nless the contract be for necessaries, as he is not
legally liable to an action upon the
contract, any promise of indemnity to
one becoming surety, and equally the
undertaking of any for the performance
of the contract by the infant, may properly enough be regarded as ai original
undertaking, since no other party is
legally responsible for the same undertaking: Chapin vs. Lapham, 20 Pick.
R. 467. SuAw, C. J., here says: "One
distinction * * is well settled, that when
the party making the promise is alone

I
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liable, or when * * the whole credit is
given to him, it is an original and not
a collateral promise." So also, where,
for any reason, a new party consents
to assume a portion or the whole of a
subsisting contract or undertaking,
either on account of his own interest
in having it carried forward, and the
inability of the original contractor to
do so, or for any other sufficient consideration, his promise to pay money
will be treated as original, notwithstanding the original contract, for some
purposes, may still be regarded as a
subsisting one. This point is very fully
discussed by SHAw, C. J., in Nelson va.
Boynton, supra. The true test seems
to be, in cases of this character, whether
the new party is acting as an original
party, so far as the new contract is
concerned, or'whether it is done merely
in aid of the original contractor: Sinclair vs. Richardson, 12 Vt. R. 33; Fell
on Guaranties, ch. 2, j 16. The -test
here proposed is thus stated by the
learned author: "It is only necessary to
inquire to whom it was understood, between the parties, that the * * * creditor
should look for payment, in the first
instance." This, it seems to us, may
be taken as the most decisive definition,
in regard to this whole class of cases.
It is not precisely determinable upon
the inquiry, to whom the credit was
given, which has been regarded, in a
very large number of' cases, as decisive,
that the undertaking was original and
not collateral: and so it must be considered in the greatest number of cases
of this class. For there are, unqtuestionably, a good'many cases, where the
credit is given exclusively to some
third person, who nevertheless assumes
the position of a mere surety in the
case, and where the principal debtor is
expected, in the first instance, to make
the payment, and if so, the party upon
whose credit the debt was at first created, was all along known and under-
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stood, by the creditor, to be but a mere
surety, And not to have assumed, to any
extent, or #r any purpose, the position
or resjionsibility of a principal. In
such cases the promise, or assurance,
that the debt should be paid, or that
the principal debtor should or would
pay it, in whatever form it is given, is
not valid as a ground of action, unless
in writing. But where no credit, and
no communication, and no expectation
of payment exists, or has existed, in
regard to the original party, who is in
fact the principal in the transaction,
the new party, who is in fact a surety,
but consents to stand as principal, will
be liable as such upon his contract,
although not in writing. Thus, one
who sells goods or performs labor may
know that it is for the benefit of a
party to whom he will not consent to
give credit, or with whom he will not
have any communication. If, then, it
is understood that he deals exclusively
with'another, who thus consents to
stand as principal, he will be liable as
puch, without writing.
There is also a broad distinction
between contracts of an ancillary character, whether they are executed or executory. An executed contract, which
another proposes to assume, cannot
fairly be regarded as original aud
binding, without writing, probably, unless the original debt is extinguished,
either directly, by the creditor taking
the new contract in lieu of it, or else,
indirectly, as argued in the principal
case, by putting funds of some kind
into the hands of the new promissor,
which he is at liberty to apply to the
payment of the original debt. In this
mode the new party, thus secured or
indemnified by the actual deposit of
money or its equivalent, becomes himself, to that extent, the principal. And
equity will compel him to perform the
trust thus created, although not evidenced iy writing. And his promise
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to pay the debt or see it paid, or even
that the original debtor will pay it, is,
so far as the fund in his hands is concerned, a promise for his own debt, or
duty, and not that of any other person.
This is well illustrated by Gold vs.
Phillips, 10 Johns. 412; Olmstead vs.
Greenly, 18 Johns. 12; Mallory vs.
Gillett, 21 N. Y. Ct. App. 412. And
the case of Alger vs. Scoville, 1 Gray
391, which is the case of a promise by
one debtor to his creditor to pay that
creditor's debt to his creditors, may be
regarded as resting more upon the same
piinciple of trust, and security from the
fund in his hands, than upon the fact
of the new promise not being made to
the same creditor, according to the
case of Eastwood vs. Kenyon, aupra.
But the case of executory contracts
to pay money which shall enure in
discharge of the subsisting liability of
another, may be regarded as resting
upon somewhat different grounds. The
new party may become the actual prin-

cipal by the new arrangement, or he
may be fully indemnified for assuming
his obligation of principal as to the
future executory part of the contract;
or the principal or original party may
have become bankrupt, or insolvent, or
insane, so as to be unable or incapable
of. superintending or furnishing the
means to secure the further progress
of the work. In such cases, if the new
party be in fact the principal, as by
security, or interest, or if he consent to
act as the principal, on account of the
inability or incapacity of the real principal, by assuming to make the future
payments in the first instance, he will
ordinarily be held responsible, it is
believed, without writing. So that, as
to executory contracts, it becomes
chiefly matter of fact, or of construction, whether the new promissor in fact
assumed the attitude of a principal, or
stood as a mere surety for the performance of another.
1. F. R.
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HIRAM CORSON vs. DANIEL H. MULVANY.

Where suit is brought by vendee to enforce an agreement for the sale of land,
on a mortgage for two years, and there is no allegation that the vendee's circumstances have changed since the making of the agreement, evidence is not admissible to show that the contemplated use of the land will destroy its value within
two years, and that the mortgagor is otherwise unable to pay.
An agreement for the purchase of land at the option of vendee, is not, after
election by vendee and notice to vendor, so devoid of mutuality that it will not
be enforced.
Nor does the refusal of vendor to accept the consideration, destroy the mutuality, though it gives th6 vendee an opportunity to retract his election.
The refusal of vendor's wife to join in the conveyance, and the consequent
inability of vendee to give a mortgage on the unincumbered fee simple, does not
permit vendor to withdraw from his agreement, if vendee waives the releaie of
dower.
The grant of equity powers to the courts of Pennsylvania does not interfere
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with their jurisdiction to enforce performance of suct an agreement in an
6jectment at common law.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by D. H. Mulvany
against Hiram Corson; to enforce the specific performance of a
paper purporting to be an agreement, as follows :-, Dr. Hiram
Corson hereby agrees that D. H. Mulvany shall dig five shafts for
iron-ore on the lot of said Corson, fronting on the Spring Mill and
Marble Hall Road, and bounded 'by lands of Joseph Freas and
others, in Whitemarsh township, containing seven and threequarter acres, at any time prior to the first day of April next,
5
5 1864, and if said Mulvany shall desire to purchase
said tract of land at that time, at the price or sum
.)
(STA
of $1000, he shall have the right and' privilege of
H. C.
D. H. M. so doing, the purchase-money in that case to be
Dec. 12,1863 paid as follows: $200 cash on the execution of
the deed on the said 1st of April, and the balance
of $800 in two years thereafter, with lawful
interest payable .annually, to be secured by mortgage on the
premises.

,,In witness whereof the said parties have hereunto set theii
hands and seals, this 12th day of December,

c,
HIRAM
,cD. H.

A. D.

1863.

CORSON. [SEAL.]
MULVANY: [SEAL.]"

On 28th March 1864, Mulvany served a written notice on
Corson, of his election to take the land under the agreement,
and on the 1st April tendered the payment of $200 and mortgage for balance, which were refused. Previously, on the 21st

March, Mrs. Corson gave written notice to Mulvany that the
agreement was made without her knowledge or consent, and that

sh* would not sign the deed.
On the trial Corson alleged that the agreement was in the
handwriting of Mulvany and r'etaine.d by him, and in consequence
of the confidential relations existing between the parties, Corson
signed this paper without reading it, supposing it to he a mere
memorandum, allowing the said Mulvany to test the said ground
for iron-ore, the said Mulvany owning property in this vicinity;
that Corson did nQt suppose that he was disposing of his property
for $200 in cash and a mortgage for $800, payable in two years,

when, in the mean time, the ore could be taken out, or the lot so
dug up as to leave him without security; an offer to prove which,
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and also evidence to show the record liens against D. H. Mulvany,
were rejected by the court, and formed the ground of the first
and second assignments of error.
Corson further assigned for errorPoints 3 and 4. The ruling of the court that the contract after
election had sufficient mutuality to be enforced.
Point 5. The ruling that the refusal of his wife to sign the deed
did not prevent specific performance, if the plaintiff waived her
joining.
Point 6. The ruling that the plaintiff could have remedy in
this form of action.
C.

N. Corson, for plaintiff in error.-1 and 2. The first and

second specifications will be considered together. We offered to
prove, first, that the lot would in two years be so dug up as to
make it valueless as a security for the balance of the purchasemoney; and secondly, that the unsatisfied mortgages and judgments against Mulvany were to such an amount as left us no
personal security as against him, and therefore, as Mulvany
claimed to recover on purely equitable grounds, it would have
been inequitable for him to take our property without giving us
security for the $800 unpaid purchase-money-he paying but
$200 in cash. It is well settled that a chancellor will not decree
specific performance when the bargain is a hard one, and where
there is even a doubt of the fairness of the demand made. A
chancellor will even go further, as is decided in Henderson vs.
Hays, 2 Watts 148, and 1 Watts 401, which decide that if even
the agreement is perfectly good and binding on both parties, still
a chancellor will not decree a specific performance if any.doubt
about the fairness of the transaction is apparent. This offer
manifestly showed that it would have been unconscionable for a
chancellor to enforce the performance of an agreement which
required the party to part with his property without the purchasemoney being paid or secured.
3 and 4. The third and fourth specifications will be considered
together. The question presented is whether there was such
mutuality in the agreement as bound both parties so that either
could enforce performance against the other. The agreement
shows that there was nothing binding upon Mulvany to purchase
the property at all. Such being the case performance could not
be claimed by him against Corson: Bodine vs. Gladding, 9 Harris
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53; Wison vs. Clark, 1 W. & S. 555; Parris7hvs. Koons, 1 Pars.
91; Pugh vs. Good, 3 W. & S. 62, Bright. Eq. 187; Graham
vs. Pancoast, 6 Casey 97; Elder vs. Bobison, 7 Harris 364.
All these cases clearly decide, where there is no mutuality in the
agreement, specific performance cannot be enforced. The court
below in fact concedes this, but avoids the effect of these rulings
by holding that Mulvany, on the 28th of March 1864, made his
election to take the property, which bound him to do so, and this
cured the agreement wherein before it was radically defective on
the score of mutuality.

Now, then, as this action was founded

upon the written agreement, and declared upon it in the narr., and
not upon what Mulvany did subsequently thereto, can he recover
otherwise than upon the agreement itself? We say that he could
not make evidence for himself with the view of making good the
agreement which is in'itself bad. He could not take all the
chances between the 12th of December 1863 (date of agreement)
and the 28th of March 1864, of its being an advantageous or
disadvantageous purchase to him, without the other party having
during the same period the same advantage. The court admit
that Mulvany was bound to nothing until March 28th, and if he
had found no ore by that time, although he would have had the
lot dug up, he could, according to the reasoning of the court,
have been under no obligation to take the property. It was,
therefore, a one-sided agreement until it suited Mulvany to take
it, there being no stipulation in the agreement that he was to
have the right to elect to take or not take it between its date and
April 1st 1864, and in truth he never did elect to take it without
the joining of the wife in the deed, until the day of trial, in court,
although he had written notice, on the 21st of March 1864, that
she refused to sign the deed. We have been unable to find a
case where a chancellor would enforce specific performance under
such circumstances. This court has certainly never so decided in
any of their reported cases.
5. The question is, whether the wife's refusal to sign the deed
did not put an end to a decree for specific performance. That it
did is decided in the following cases: Weller vs. Weand, 2 Grant
104, 1 Grant 255, 7 Watts 107, 143, 5 W. & S. 486, 8 Barr 363,
Bright. Eq. 192. This position was conceded in the court below,
and in order to avoid the effect of the same, Mulvany on the trial
offered to take the deed without the wife's joining. Now, even
if it be true that the party may do so, yet in no case can it ba
Vo.
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shown that the vendor was bound to take a mortgage for part of
the purchase-money on such a title. If, therefore, Mulvany had
offered to pay in cash the whole purchase-money at the time of
the trial, it may be that he had the right to take the deed as be
proposed to do. But as he offered and insisted upon our taking
the mortgage, it could only be on the interest conveyed by Hiram
Corson alone. The agreement contemplated a mortgage upon a
clear fee in the land. We were entitled to such a mortgage.
6. Ejectment will not lie to enforce specific performance now.
It was originally allowed from necessity (Coolbaugh vs. Pierce, 8
S. & R. 419); but since the grant of equity powers to the courts,
the remedy is on the equity side only.
C. R. Fox, for defendant in error.-The want of mutuality is
taken away by the election of Mulvany to purchase: Kerr vs.
Day, 2 Harris 112; Batten on Specific Performance, ch. 5, p. 61;
Palmervs. Scott, 1 R. & M. 394; Dowell vs. Dew, 1 Y. & C. 846;
Stansbury vs. Fringer,11 Gill. & J. 149; Western Railroad Ob.
vs. Babcock, 6 Mete. 846.
The consent of vendee to take such title as vendor could give,
does away with the objection that the wife refused to join in the
deed: Clark vs. Beirer, 7 Watts 110; Shurtz vs. Thomas, 8 Barr
863; Young vs. Paul, 2 Stock. Ch. 414; Addams's Eq. 110;
Story's Eq. §§ 775, 779.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-orson agreed that Mulvany should be permitted
to dig five shafts on his lot in search of iron-ore, betw**t4
date of his agreement and the 1st of April following, mAXA11
Mulvany desired to purchase the lot at $1000, he shov4 .h
the right and privilege of doing so; the purchase-money to .bi
paid, $200 on execution of the deed, and $800 in two yw
thereafter, with interest, and to be secured by mortgage on tm
premises.
The first and second assignments of error will be considered
together. Corson offered to prove that, by the ordinary process
of miiing ore, the land would be so dug up within two years as
to be valueless; and to prove the amount of unsatisfied mortgages
and judgments against Mulvany. The rejection of this evidenca
is alleged to, be error, because such facts it is said would have
iMduced a chancellor to withhold a decree for specific performance,
* ich is of grace and not of right.

CORSON TO. MULVAT.

It is not alleged that Mulvany's circumstances had changed
after the making of the contract, and we are asked to withhold
relief merely because of consequences growing directly out of
the terms of the agreement. There is no proof of fraud or unfairness, nor is there any of weakness of intellect, intoxication,
surprise, or any circumstance affecting the capacity of Dr. Corson
to contract. His whole case is, that he agreed to sell his lot and
defer the payment of $800 of the purchase-money for two years,
on the security of a mortgage alone, and that within this time all
the ore may be removed from his lot. This was a consequence
plainly within his view, in making his contract. Its purpose was
to test the lot for the presence of ore. His object was to do this
at Mulvany's expense, and if ore were found, to obtain a higher
price for his lot. Mulvany was willing to do this, provided, if
he found ore, he should have a right to purchase. These are the
manifest inferences to be drawn from the contract itself. Now,
after ore has been discovered in the fifth and last shaft, he asks
Mulvany to be turned away without obtaining the very thing
which induced him to expend his.means in experimenting. Corson did not bind himself to pay the outlay. How can a chancellor refuse his aid in so plain a case? We see no error in the
rejection of the evidence.
The third and fourth errors assert, that the contract is not
mutual, because an option was given to Mulvany only to convert
the privilege into a purchase. If this be true, it will prevent
specific performance, for, it is settled, equity will not enforce
specific performance where the remedy is not mutual. Both
parties have signed and sealed this agreement, and the language
of the instrument clearly imports a covenant on part of Mulvany
to pay the purchase-money, if he elects to purchase. The language of a writing may be wholly'that of the vendor, yet the
vendee's sealing or accepting it will bind him, and whether the
action against him should be case or covenant is not material:
Dubbs vs. Finley, 2 Barr 397; McFarson'8 Appeal, 1 Jones
504-10 ; Campbell vs. Shtzw, 3 Watts 60 ; Cott vs. Selden, 5 Id.
525; Meade vs. Weaver, 7 Barr 330, 331. In the last-named
case, the effort of Chief Justice GIBSON was to show, that covenant would not lie when the party had not sealed the writing;
however, debt or assumpsit might. The English authorities cited
in that case, conclusii ely show that the entry of the grantee, or
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his acceptance of a deed-poll, are equivalent to sealing; and
covenant will lie.
Then the naked question is, whether in a mutual contract to
give an option, the party who gives notice of his election is bound
to performance. To assert the negative is simply to deny the
power of making a conditional contract, and of declaring that
performance shall take place when the contingency happens. If
any contract to purchase a vessel at sea upon her safe arrival in
port, no one will dispute that an obligation to deliver on one
side, and to pay on'the other, arises upon her safe arrival. The
vessel miy never arrive, and the contract is not absolute to performance on either side, till the contemplated contingency occurs;
but the contract is binding, and only awaits the event to become
binding also to performance.
Now, as a contingency or condition on which performance is
suspended, what difference is there between a contingency depending on the action of third persons or the controlling power
of Providence, and one depending on the act of one of the ppties? The uncertainty which attends the contingency exist, in
either case. The vessel may not arrive, or the party may not
elect, but if either event takes place, the contingency has occurred. A choice or an election is but a fact, and wherein does
it differ from any other fact made the condition of perfornlance?
The agreement is mutual. One says, I will sell if you concla4e
to purchase; the other says, I will pay if I do conclude to purchase. He then resolves and says, I have concluded. The contingency upon which performance was rested has happened.. Why
are not both bound? One would think it a plain case of mutual
ebligation, to perform on the happening of the event which ws
fixed as the condition of performance. The buyer tenders his
money, and, clearly, the seller is bound to receive it. By the
very offer to pay, the purchaser not only recognises the obligation
of his previous assent to the contract, but the happening also of
the fact on which his obligation to perform rested. The offer or
tender is not itself the election, it isbut the consequence of it.
Election and notice of it precedes the tender.
At this point a new and ingenious turn is given to the argument. It is said, but, if the seller refuse to accept the tender,
the purchaser may retract; he is not bound, and of course the
remedy is not mutual. But the fallacy lies in this; he is not
bound, not because no obligation to perform arose in his election,
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but beeause he sets up the seller's breach of contract by refusal,
as a discharge of the obligation. The obligation was there, but
because the seller chose not to recognise it, the purchaser now
chooses to be discharged from it.
Take a better test. The purchaser writes to the seller, I have
concluded to take your property according to our contract. I
will leave a deed prepared for your execution, and a mortgage
according to the terms, and will meet you to perform our bargain.
Will it he said, that after this explicit notice of his election, the
'urchaser can fly from his contract without a refusal of the seller
to accept performance ? Then, how can the seller avail himself
of his own refusal, as a ground of non-performance, so long as
the purchaser declines to avail himself of the discharge which
refusal affords ?
The error into which the opposite argument runs is in supposing that election is the initiation of a new contract, instead of
the stipulation on which performance of an old one rests. It is
&e idea of a proposition which may be retracted before acceptWne% und no contract arises: forgetting, that here there is a
cofitract for election, which-prevents a refusal to 'accept. Therefore, it is said, there can be no obligation without the consent of

the other. This loses sight of two facts ; first, that a previous
assent has been given; and second, that the party notified of the
election has no right to dissent. The party is already bound to
accept performance, when the election shall be made, and when
made his previous assent attaches. Ile may refuse, it is true, but
it is not to decline a proposition, but to refuse performance of a
bargain. .If it were the initiation of a new contract, as if one
should voluntarily offer me his bond, he would not become my
debtor until I accept it. I am under no obligation to receive his
bond, but if I had bound myself to receive his bond in performance of some stipulation already agreed upon, I would find it
difficult to refuse it.
", If this case stands in need of authority, it has one directly in
point.' In .err vs. Day, 2 Harris 112, the agreement was a
lease for three years at a certain rent, with the privilege of buyink the lot at any time during the term, at the price of $1200,
in such payments as might be agreed on, not exceeding ten years
from the date. The title passed into J)ay as purchaser from the
'lessors, and the lease into the hands of a s(cond assignee of the
tenant. The first assignee gave notice of his election to Pay the
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purchaser. The opinion of this court was delivered by B
,.,
holding, that the title vested upon notice of the election in equity,
and operated as a conversion of the lessor's estate into personalty, that the election by the assignee was good against the
alienee of the lessors, and he became liable to specific performance, and, moreover, was bound to take notice of the right Qf
election contained in the lease. Kerr vs. -Dayhas this feature
to weaken it, that the instalments were not defined in the agreement, but left to be settled at a period not exceeding ten years.
This, no doubt, led to the remark in lElden vs. Robinson, 7 Harris 365, of LoWRIE, J., who had decided Kerr vs. Day in the
lower court, that the principle was strained t6 its utmost in Kerr
vs. Day. But he did not deny its authority. In the present
case there was nothing left open in the contract, and as soon as
Mulvany made his election, his duties under the agreement were
fixed and certain. The opinion of Justice BELL is referred to
for numerous authorities examined in detail.
Wilson vs. Clark, 1 W. & S. 554, and Bodine vs. Gladding, 9
Harris 50, have no bearing on this case. They were clear c.-,of a want of mutuality, where the Statute of Frauds in the one,
and abandonment of the contract in the other, caused the agreement to be not binding. Admitting to the fullest extent the doctrine of these two cases, that want of mutuality is a bar to specific
performance, either upon a bill in equity or on ejectment, we are
of opinion there is no want of mutuality in the contract between
the parties.
We see no error in the fifth assignment. It is in the powcr
of a party to waive full performance, and accept such t:ti a, tLe

vendor is able to give. Mulvany's waiver, therefore, of a release
of dower by Corson's wife, took away the force of the objection
that she refused to sign a conveyance.
The sixth error raises the question, whether the common law
remedy by ejectment, used as a means of specific performance, is
taken away by the grant of equity powers to the Courts of Common
Pleas. Clearly, the legislature did not intend to take away common law actions by a grant of equity jurisdiction. The Act of
1806, providing that when a statutory remedy is given it must
be pursued, does not apply. That law refers to specific remedies
given for special cases. But the grant of equity jurisdiction is
simply a grant of certain general equity powers in addition to
powers already existing, and not in exclusion. It is rather a

